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SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-RESIDENT
MOTORISTS
By THOMAS F. KONOP
Within the past five years statutes have been enacted in at
least five states making effectual the service of process on a nonresident motorist in negligence actions by the appointment of
an agent and mailing the process to the defendant. In a recent
case of State ex rel Crokldte v. Belden, Circuit Judge, 211 N. W.
916, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained the constitutionality of Sec. 85.15 Sub. Sec. (3) Statutes of 1925 which provides:
"The use and operation by a non-resident of a motor
vehicle over the highways of Wisconsin shall be deemed an
appointment by such non-resident of the secretary of state
to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all legal processes in any action or proceeding
against him, growing out of such use or operation resulting in damage or loss to person or property, and said use
or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that
any such process against him which is so served shall be of
the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally. Service of such process shall be made by serving
a copy upon the secretary of state or by filing such copy
in his office, together with a fee of two dollars, and such
service shall be sufficient service upon the said non-resident;
provided, that notice of such service and a copy of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, at his last known address, and
that the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith is appended to the summons. The court in which the action is
pending may order continuances as may be necessary to
afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the
action, not exceeding ninety days from the date of the filing
of the action in such court. The fee of two dollars paid by
the plaintiff to the secretary of state at the time of the service shall be taxed in his costs if he prevails in the suit.
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The secretary of state shall keep a record of all such processes which shall show the day and hour of servide."
This statute and the statutes of New Jersey, Connecticut
and New Hampshire are substantially copies of a Massachusetts
statute which was passed in 1923. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts sustained the validity of such statute in the
case of Pawloski v. Hess, 144 N. E. 760; 35 A. L. R. 945. Following
the Pawloski case the validity of the New Jersey statute was
"sustained by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of
Martin v. Condon, 129 Atl. 738 and by the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey in the case of Pizzutti v. Wuchter, 134 Atl.
727. In the four cases there was only one dissent, by Eschweiler,
J. of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Before discussing the provisions of this statute a few general
observations should be made on the necessity and requirements
of sufficient service and on the nature and use of public highways.
Notice has always been considered as the life of a judicial
proceeding. It is "the vital breath to animate judicial jurisdiction over the person." As was said in Black v. Black, 4 Bradf. 205,
"A judicial determination of one's rights without notice would,
indeed, be a mere mockery, a parrot-like mimickry of the forms
of law." From the earliest times notice and opportunity to be
heard in defense have been associated with jurisprudence.
Fortescue, J., said: "The Laws of God and man give the party
an opportunity to make a defense. I remember to have heard
it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion that
even God Himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he
was called upon to make his defense ;" and the same authority
says that, "Natural Justice requires that every man shall be
heard-before he is condemned in judgment." The Magna Charta
and our own constitutions speak out in emphatic terms that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Our Supreme Court in Baker v.
Baker, 61 L. Ed. 386, on page 392 said: "The fundamental requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings is the opportunity to be heard (citing cases). To hold one bound by judgment
who has not had such opportunity is contrary to the first principles of justice."
The Common Law requires personal service of process.
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Personal service has always been favored in the law. Substituted service and constructive service are of statutory origin.
Although substituted service is a less violent departure from
personal service than constructive service by publication, strict
compliance is always required in boh cases. Now quite generally statutes provide four ways of serving process:
First. Personal Service,-by reading the process to the
defendant, or by delivering to and leaving with the defendant a
true copy.
Second. Substituted Service,--by leaving a copy of the
process at the last and usual place of abode.
Third. Constructive Service,-.by publication.
Fourth. Statutes providing for personal service or process
outside of the state, or by mailing the process to the defendant
at his place of abode outside of the state; and providing that
such service or mailing shall be equivalent to constructive service by publication.
Under the ways provided service can always readily be
made on residents of the state. The first way is impossible on
a non-resident if he is without the jurisdiction of the state. The
second way is impossible on a non-resident as he has no place
of abode in the state. The third and fourth ways alone, are now
universally held to be ineffectual in a personal action.
Each state of course has the right to determine by what
process and procedure rights may be adjudicated. But constitutional limitations cannot be violated. The process and
procedure provided must afford reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. The boundaries of reasonable notice are
now quite well defined.
Even before the frequently cited case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U. S. 714 (1877), constructive service by public alone, in a personal action was held to be void. In that case it was held "that
where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal
rights and obligati6ns of the defendants, that is, where the suit
is merely in personam, constructive service in this form upon a
non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose. Process from the
tribunals of one state cannot run into another state, and summon
parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to
proceedings against them. Publication of process or notice
within the state where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater
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obligation upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent to
him out of the state, and process published within it, are equally
unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal liability."
Since this decision it has been and is now uniformly recognized that the only ways in which a court can acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a non-resident, is
first, by voluntary appearance; second, by service of process on
him while temporarily in the state; and third, if he has property
in the state by bringing under the control of the court such property at the time of the commencement of the action by publicaion or its equivalent. This may be done by attachment, garnishment, injunction or any order which gives the court control over
the property; and a personal judgment in the third way is limited to the value of such property.
The decision in Pennoyer v. Neff is based -on the theory that
when non-residents property in the state is brought under the
jurisdiction of the court at the commencement of the action, the
defendant will in all probability be notified by his agent in charge
of the property. The defendant is presumed to know that under
the law, his property is subject to the laws of the state relating
to title, transfer, assessment, taxation, etc. As was well said in
Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Imp. Co., 130 U. S. 564; 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 603; 32 L. Ed. 1045, "It is, therefore the duty of the owner of
real estate who is a non-resident, to take measures that in some
way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisiion; and if he fails to do'this, and fails to get.notice by the
6rdinary publications which have usually been required in such
cases;- it -is his- misfortune and he must abide by the consequences."
Pennoyer v. Neff is of course not applicable to actions in rem
or actions affecting status such as divorce actions; but it has always
applied to personal actions in tort or contract against non-residents,
and any service which falls short of Pennoyer v. Neff has been uniformly held void.
Now as to the fourth way of service. It is uniformly held
not only by the Supreme Court of the United States but by the
state courts as well, that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over a non-resident and render a valid judgment against him in
a personal action, by a personal service of its process upon him
outside of the state; or by mailing the process to him. In addi-
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tion to such service or such mailing there mu'st be some proceeding instituted to give the court control over the non-resident's property in the state.*
Now as to the nature of a public highway. As a rule the
abutting property owners own the fee and the public has merely
an easement of travel. This easement may be acquired by user,
dedication or condemnation. In condemnation it is only the
easement that i.s condemned. Unless the public highway is
dedicated to some particular mode of travel, and this is rarely
the case, the use of the public highway is open to all modes of
travel. A lublic highway is a way in which all the people have
a right to travel by all the usual modes of travel. At this late
day it cannot be assumed and a court will not hold that travel by
automobile is not the usual mode of travel. Is thi*s right of
travel limited to the citizens of the state? Truly not. It is
:pen to all the public, to citizen, stranger and foreigner (29 C. J.
547). As was said in the case of Hyde v. Minnesota (S. D.) 136
N. W. 92, "He has whether an owner of the land or not, whether
a citizen or a stranger, the right in common with the rest of the
public, to travel all of the public highways."
True, the state in the exercise of its police power can regslate highways. But that too is subject to constitutional limitations. The state cannot discriminate against the non-resident
inregulating its use. The right of a citizen to pass through a
3tate is one guaranteed to him by the constitution. Crandall v.
Vevada, 18 L. Ed. 745; Ward v. Maryland, 20 L. Ed. 449; Welton
v. Missouri, 23 L. Ed. 347; Notes 14 L. R. A. 579.
Now in the light of the general principles above discussed
et us revert to the provisions of the statute. In substance it
provides that the use of a public highway in Wisconsin by a non-esident motorist shall be deemed the appointment of a state
)fficer upon whom process may be served in a personal action
:or damages growing out of such use; and that by such use the
aon-resident motorist agrees that such service has the same force
ind validity as personal service. This i.snot made applicable
:o resident motorists. Can a state impose conditions upon non-esidents that it does not impose upon residents when they use
* Notes, 16 L. I. A. 231-232; INotes, 50 L. R A.. 577-582; Pennoyer v.
qeff;
v. Sanderson et al (La.), 47 So. 600; Baker v. Baker. etc. 61
I- Ed. Aikroan
386; Flexner
v. FaTson, 109 N. E. 327; 63 L. Ed. 250.
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the public highway on a par with residents which they have a
perfect right to do? That is just what the above statute imposes. It is a discrimination pure and simple. If a non-resident
has a right to enter the state to exercise his "privileges and imunities" as a citizen, how is he to enter unless it si over the public highway? The right of a non-resident to enter a state and
transact business therein on a par with citizens of that state cannot be impaired or denied. No one can claim that requiring a
higher auto-registration fee of a non-resident than that of a resident would not violate the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the constitution. There is no authority that a public highway
can be considered as the common property of a state as fish,
game, public schools, etc., to warrant discrimination. As was
said in the Slaughter House Cases, 21 L. Ed. 394, and repeatedly
re-affirmed by the courts: "The sole purpose (of the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the Constitution) was to declare to the
several states that whatever those rights as you grant or establish them to your citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose
restrictions on their exercise, the same neither more nor less,
shall be the measure of the right of citizens of other states within your jurisdiction."
Undoubtedly the above provision is analogous to the provision requiring foreign corporations as a condition of doing
business in the state to consent to the appointment of a state
officer as one upon whom service of process may be made. But
the courts have" repeatedly held that corporations are not within
the protection of the "Privileges and immunities" clause of the
constitution; and that individuals are protected by that clause.
The power of a legislature to appoint an agent in a state for a
non-resident individual upon whom service of process may be
made has been repeatedly repudiated.
The agency provided for in this statute is a novel one. It
is created without defendant's consent and no provision is made
for the agent thus appointed to notify the defendant. The agent
plays no part in the serving of the process. As was well said by
Eschweiler, J . "Agency implies duties and obligations, but here
his agency for such a non-resident is the merest shadow; he has
absolutely no part to play in that which is essential in "due
process," namely, the giving of notice to the one concerned."
(211 N. W. 921). But even if the statute did provide that the
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secretary mail a notice to the defendant, such mailing would,
under the decisions, be ineffectual for any purpose.
The statute also provides that in addition to the service upon
the state officer the plaintiff shall within ten days mail to the
defendant at his last known address a notice of.service on such
officer and a copy of the summons with an affidavit of complance. If personal service outside of the state without the court
.acquiring control over the defendant's property in the state, is
void, then the mere mailing of a process to the last place of abode
cannot be deemed service within the -"due process" clause.
The case of Aikmann v. Sanderson & Porter (La.) 47 So. 600
was a tort action for causing death by negligence. It was held
that residents of New York cannot be brought before the courts
of Louisiana by a mailed citation and petition. Service by mail
alone, outside of the state has been -repeatedly held not to be
due process of law.
The Wisconsin and New Jersey Courts cite with approval
the Massachusetts case of Pawloski v, Hess. The decision in that
case was based on the ground that it was an exercise of the
police power. No one doubts that to promote safety the state
has the power to regulate automobile traffic on its highways. It
may regulate speed, turning, lighting, etc., and it may also require registration of non-resident motor vehicles and payment
of fees for the building and repairr of highways to make them
safe for driving. But, can the state by statute provide different
regulations for the non-resident automobilist than it does for
its own? Can it impose different restrictions on speed, lighting; or can it exact a higher registration fee? Clearly not. The
non-resident has the same rights on the highways of the state
as the resident. Can the usual requirements of "due process
of law" be denied a non-resident because he uses what he has
a right to use?
To justify its decision, the New Jersey Court in the Pizzutti
case, 134 Atl: 727, on page 728 said this: "We think however
that in the instant case there exists a feature not existing in the
line of cases mentioned which differentiates the present case
from the line of cases mentioned. This ground of differentiation
is the power of the state of prohibit a non-resident from doing
acts within the state dangerous. to life and property, unless such
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non-resident consents to the exercise of jurisdiction over him in
our courts in causes of action growing out of the commission of
such act within the state."
Does the non-resident motorist enter the state to do acts'
which are dangerous to life and property?. Certainly not. Is
the driving of an automobile on a public highway per se dangerous to life and property? It may have been. considered such
twenty-five years ago. But, today, when automobile traffic is
theusual and practically the only traffic on our highways, a man
cannot be considered little short of a criminal just because he
drives an automobile on a public highway. Is the non-resident
motorist less careful than our resident motorist so as to justify
a discrimination against him and deny him the usual legal notice
and opportunity to a hearing? It is hard to see how the use
and operation of an automobile in a state by a non-resident can
be made the basis of discrimination against him. It is still
harder to understand how there can be any causal relation between the operation of an automobile and the manner of service
of process in actions arising out. of its use.
Much reliance is placed by the courts that have sustained
the validity of these statutes upon two decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States; Hendricks v. Maryland (235 U. S.
610; 59 L. Ed. 385) and Kane v. New Jersey, (61 L. Ed. 222).
Both cases were criminal cases and did not involve the question
of sufficiency of service of process. Both were prosecutions for
failure on the part of a non-resident motorist to register his car
and pay the required registration fee which resident motorist
were required to do. There was no discrimination against the
non-resident.
Since the decisions in the Hendricks case and the Kane
case, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of
Flexner v. Farso , '63 L. Ed. 250. The facts were briefly these:
Flexner brought suit in Kentucky against Farson, Son & Co.,
a partnership doing business in Kentucky but the members of
which resided outside of Kentucky. In conformity to a Kentucky statute, service of process was made on the agent of the
firm in charge of their business in Kentucky. Judgment was
rendered against the firm. Action of debt was brought on the
Kentucky judgment in Cook County, Illinois. The court re-
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fused to give full faith and credit to the Kentucky judgment and
judgment for the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Illinois. Upon error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision.
Flexnerv. Farson,109 N. E. 327; 63 L. Ed. 250; Aikman v. Sanderson et al., 47 So. 600.
In the case of Baker v. Baker, etc., 61 L. Ed. 386, where the aid
of judgments in personam obtained in Tennessee was invoked
in Kentucky, the court said, "But it is now too well settled to
be opened to further dispute that the 'full faith and credit' clause
and the acts of Congress passed pursuant to it do not entitle a
judgment in personam to extra-territorial effect if it be made to
appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person
sought to be bound." The court on page 392 said further: "And
to assume that a party resident beyond the confines of the state is
required to come within its borders and submit his personal controversy to its tribunals upon receiving notice of the suit at the place
of his residence-isa futile attempt -to extend the authority and control
of a state beyond its own territory."
In the light of these decisions, the Flexner Case, the Baker
Case, what will be the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States when a case is presented involving the question of
what credence is to be given to a personal judgment obtained
upon service as provided in this statute under the "full faith
and credit" clause of the constitution? Will that court sustain
a service that falls far short of the requirements of Pennoyer v.
Neff?

